Open Letter to the Shibance Community

Dear Community,

It’s Shibu here, and I’d like to write this open letter to the community. I mentioned in my previous update that Shibance was undergoing a dramatic restructuring to address our shortcomings. To elaborate, we had been working on a merger with an experienced project team, which would have brought significant expertise on marketing, business development and community management, as well as a new source of funding. Unfortunately, these talks have stalled.

Having said this, we’re currently in very positive discussions with an experienced team who are already familiar with the project and community, and we’re optimistic on a successful handover. We would like to still explore all options to keep the project running, so please do reach out to the team if this interests you.

From my side however, sadly we’re at the point where we’ve done everything we can to make Shibance a success, but we have come up against just too many issues. So it’s with deep regret that we will be stopping any further development, and focusing on securing a successful transition to a new team.

I feel it’s important to give you all full context, so you understand why we’ve been forced down this route.

Development Issues

One major issue we’ve faced from the start of the project is our backend developer, Wolong, who crippled our progress from the beginning. It’s only been through the extremely hard work and initiative from ShibaRiba and myself that we were able to mitigate his errors, and survive to this point.

Some of the issues we faced:

  • Wolong incorrectly hardcoded the BSC Shibance LP/Dev Fund fee split in the original code, resulting in the dev fund fee income being roughly 75% less than it should have been. This is despite the issue being picked up by our auditors pre-launch. Wolong arrogantly dismissed their concerns, saying they didn’t understand the code. It was only after further investigation by myself post-launch where the extent of the issue was discovered, resulting in us having to significantly amend our tokenomics.
  • On the KCC Shibance platform, we planned to have 10% of our emissions flow to the dev fund, similar to other DEX/Launchpads, in order to fund future development. However, Wolong incorrectly coded this as 5%, further reducing our dev income. The above issues alone substantially crippled our income, which should have been a source of marketing and development funds, as well as funds to support the WOOF price. To be clear, all fee income has gone towards buying/burning WOOF/KWOOF, and towards ad-hoc marketing.
  • Wolong was incapable of writing the KCC launch snapshot code, leaving ShibaRiba and myself to do this, stretching us substantially at an extremely busy time.
  • For our private sale, he used flawed vesting contracts, copied from an unknown source, which led to all of the vesting contracts breaking when private sale participants were 50% vested. He dismissed the funds as unrecoverable. However, after further investigation from myself and ShibaRiba, we managed to recover these funds, and find new, working vesting contracts. This was again another massive sink of our time.
  • Since the KCC launch, Wolong mentioned he had been working on developing the lottery. However, with only a week left until lottery launch, we discovered that he had done nothing, leaving me and ShibaRiba to quickly implement this, working around the clock. He also contributed nothing to the NFT farming, which was again entirely managed by ShibaRiba and me (supported by the talented graphical designer Big Shibu).
  • The launchpad structure and code flow was entirely designed by myself, with Equi’s support for the tokenomics, and coordinated with a contracted backend developer. This was yet another key development that should have been Wolong’s responsibility that had to be taken up by the team. It’s been very time consuming, although the backend code is now completed.
  • It’s recently come to light that Wolong also covered up a critical error with the block halving, with the current deployed contract code unable to achieve the 10 WOOF/Block emission rate. We only discovered this once we fully took over his duties, and the current emissions on both platforms are 20 WOOF/Block, which is the lowest we can practically go.
  • Wolong decided to leave the team just prior to the previous block-halving, lottery and NFT launches, giving a few hours’ notice. This led to the period being an incredibly difficult and stressful time for the other devs, and I’m proud we still managed to release polished products for both the Lottery and NFT Farming, in line with our schedule.

Marketing Issues

As well as development issues, we’ve faced substantial issues on the marketing side, which has led to an unsustainable situation. From pre-launch up until after KCC launch, I was responsible for making all marketing, business-development and community decisions, as well as writing or editing every Shibance press release. However, with the developer issues, this became unsustainable, and I was forced to focus on our development.

Following this, control was passed over to the marketing team, although due to lack of planning and technical knowledge, I’ve still found myself writing our articles at the last minute, such as our NFT Farming and Lottery releases.

There have been marketing failures which many of you have recognised, including our poorly executed Shibance CryptOlympics, obscure launchpad teasers, and many announcements being written last-minute, leading to rushed, poorly thought-out statements.

We’ve spent substantial amounts of money on ineffective marketing campaigns, including spending a 5-figure sum on a Turkey marketing campaign (for which the effectiveness can be gauged by our Shibance Turkey Telegram group of 45 members), and getting scammed for thousands by a false marketing group.

I have to acknowledge that the marketing team has put in substantial time and effort, as well as being significantly personally invested. However, being unable to effectively market or develop new business, as well as having only a basic understanding of our platform, it’s been clear that our current trajectory was unsustainable, hence the previous decision to bring in new expertise.

Next Steps

Given all of the above, I hope you can understand why we have come to this decision. From our side, the only option left is to cease any further development on Shibance, and let someone else take over the mantle. The development team have put in blood, sweat and tears into this project from day one, and whilst we’re extremely proud of what we’ve achieved so far, we have to recognise when we can do no more. I know this is very tough to hear, and I’m personally deeply sorry it’s had to come to this.

As discussed previously, we’re in advanced discussions with a team to take over the project, who have the experience and skills to make this project a success. And we are open to all ideas to keep the project running, so please do get in contact with us if you would like to be involved. We have a completed (but un-audited) backend launchpad code, as an incentive for anyone willing to take this task on.

We are incredibly grateful to you, the community, for supporting us through thick and thin. What you guys have done is just incredible, despite the issues we’ve faced. Our OGs have worked tirelessly and loyally on this project, and all your work has been massively appreciated. I’d also like to thank the team for creating a great platform, with a clean, responsive interface, great graphics and a well thought out structure. I truly believe this isn’t the end for Shibance, and I thank you all for supporting us through this journey.

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